A query is said to be secure against inference attacks by a user if there exists no database instance for which the user can infer the result of the query, using only authorized queries to the user. In this paper, first, the security problem against inference attacks on object-oriented databases is formalized. The definition of inference attacks is based on equational logic. Secondly, the security problem is shown to be undecidable, and a decidable sufficient condition for a given query to be secure under a given schema is proposed. The idea of the sufficient condition is to over-estimate inference attacks using over-estimated results of static type inference. The third contribution is to propose subclasses of schemas and queries for which the security problem becomes decidable. Lastly, the decidability of the security problem is shown to be incomparable with the static type inferability, although the tightness of the over-estimation of the inference attacks is affected in a large degree by that of the static type inference.
Introduction
Nowadays, many people and organizations have a growing interest in data security. For a database system to be secure, secrecy, integrity, and availability of data must be achieved appropriately with respect to a given security policy. Since databases are often used as the core of the systems requiring high-level security (e.g., e-business, Web services, etc.), it is desirable that the verification of the security of databases be possible. Various authorization models for databases have been proposed and studied so far in order to both represent given security policies in a natural way and analyze the users' authorization in a rigorous way. In the context of object-oriented databases (OODBs), the method-based authorization model [1, 2] is one of the most elegant models since it is in harmony with the concept that "an object can be accessed only via its methods" in the object-oriented paradigm. In the model, an authorization A for a user u can be represented as a set of rights m(c 1 , . . . , c n ), which means that u can directly invoke method m on any tuple (o 1 , . . . , o n ) of objects such that o i is an object of class c i with 1 i n. On the other hand, even if m(c 1 , . . . , c n ) / ∈ A, u can invoke m indirectly through another method execution in several models, e.g., protection mode in [3] . Although such indirect invocations are useful for data hiding [3] , they may also allow a violation of secrecy by inference attacks in some situations. Example 1. Let Employee, Host, and Room be classes representing employees, hosts, and rooms, respectively. Suppose that a method computer returns the host which a given employee uses, and a method location returns the room in which a given host is placed. Also suppose that a method office, which returns the room occupied by a given employee, is implemented as office(x) = location(computer(x)). Now suppose that the physical network topology is top secret information. In this case, an authorization for a user u may be the one shown in Fig. 1 , where a solid (respectively dotted) arrow denotes an authorized (respectively unauthorized) method to u. Suppose that u has obtained that computer(John) = mars and office(John) = A626 using the authorized methods. Also suppose that u knows the implementation body of office as its behavioral specification. Then, u knows that location(computer(John)) = A626, and therefore, u can infer that location(mars) = A626.
On the other hand, suppose that method computer retrieves top secret information and therefore the authorization for u is set as shown in Fig. 2 . Then, u knows that location(mars) = A626, office(John) = A626, and office(x) = location(computer(x)), similarly to the former case. However, u cannot conclude that computer(John) = mars only from the above information, since there may be another host, say neptune, such that computer(John) = neptune and location(neptune) = A626.
Let S be a database schema and c 1 , . . . , c n be classes in S. An n-ary query (i.e., a composition of methods) q(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is said to be secure at (c 1 , . . . , c n ) against inference attacks by u if u cannot infer the result of q(o 1 , . . . , o n ) for any objects o i of class c i in any database instance I of S, using only authorized methods to u. Otherwise, q(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is insecure. For example, if computer(Employee) and office(Employee) are authorized, then location(x) is insecure at Host since the user can infer location(mars) = A626 under the database instance shown in Fig. 1 . On the other hand, it will be shown later that computer(x) is secure at Employee when only location (Host) and office(Employee) are authorized. It is important for database administrators to know which methods are secure and which ones are not. When an administrator finds that a method which retrieves top secret information is insecure against inference attacks by u, the administrator can prevent u from attacking the method by changing the authorization for u. The contribution of the paper is fourfold. First, the security problem against inference attacks is formally defined. As a formal model of OODB schemas, method schemas [4] are adopted since they support such basic features of OODBs as method overloading, dynamic binding, and complex objects, although the returned value of a method execution is limited to a single object. The semantics is simply defined based on term rewriting. Then, user's inference based on equational logic is defined on the assumption that all the information available to the user is the execution results of authorized methods and the implementation bodies of authorized methods. Technically, user's inference is also treated in the framework of term rewriting. The execution result of a term can be computed as it is if the user has authorization to all the methods in the term. Otherwise, there may exist an indirect way to compute the term by equivalently rewriting it to another term which contains only authorized methods. Our definition of user's inference provides the rewriting rules representing such direct/indirect computation and enables us to treat the security against inference attacks in a simple and rigorous way. Intuitively, the rule £ I represents a primitive step of inference by the user. Next, u knows that the implementation body of office(x) is location(computer(x)). The rewriting rule below represents this fact combined with the fact that the execution result of office(John) is A626: location(computer(John)) £ I A626.
Moreover, to simulate the inference based on equational logic, some more rewriting rules (e.g., location(mars) £ I A626) are necessary. Then, whether the execution result of a term can be inferred corresponds to whether the term can be reduced to an object by the rewriting rules £ I . In this example, the execution result of location(mars) can be inferred because of the rule location(mars) £ I A626. A little more complicated example will be given in Example 16 in Section 3.2.
Secondly, the security problem is shown to be undecidable. Also, a decidable sufficient condition for a given query to be secure under a given schema is proposed. The main idea of the sufficient condition is to "conservatively" approximate the user's inference. The user's inference is object-level inference, while the approximation is classlevel inference. To accomplish the class-level inference, the technique of type inference is used, where type inference means deriving the classes to which the possible results of the method execution belong. Unfortunately, exact type inference is impossible in general [4] . However, the type inference algorithm proposed in [5] can compute a set of classes which contain all the correct classes, although the set may contain some wrong classes. Using this algorithm, we can conservatively approximate user's inference.
The third contribution is to propose subclasses of schemas and queries for which the security problem becomes decidable. We focus on the linearity of schemas and/or queries, which is a popular notion of the field of term rewriting. A query (i.e., a term with variables) t is linear if no variable in t appears more than once. A schema S is linear if all the implementation bodies of the methods in S are linear. Then, in the linear case, the security problem is shown to be decidable. More precisely, the exact type inference of linear queries is possible under linear schemas, and the user's inference can be exactly simulated using the result of type inference (i.e., the proposed sufficient condition mentioned above is also a necessary condition).
The fourth contribution is to investigate the relationship between type inferability and decidability of the security problem (see also Table 1 ). The security of type-inferable but non-linear queries is undecidable under linear schemas. On the other hand, type inference is impossible for queries whose security is decidable under linear schemas. These results imply that type inferability and decidability of the security problem are incomparable (compare the second columns of Tables 1(a) and 1(b)).
In this paper we discuss "logical" inference in OODBs in the sense that the result of the inference is always true. The inference in statistical databases [6] is a kind of logical inference. Reference [7] proposes a mechanism that accomplishes maximum data availability as long as given sensitive information is secure against logical inference. Reference [8] focuses on logical inference in OODBs. Besides inferability of the result of a method execution, the article introduces the notion of controllability, which means that a user can control (alter arbitrarily) an attribute-value of an object in a database instance. We do not consider controllability since our query language does not support update operations for database instances. However, since our query language supports recursion while the one in [8] does not, detecting inferability in our formalization is not trivial.
On the other hand, some of the recent researches concentrate on "statistical" inference, i.e., inference with some statistical assumptions. Reference [9] discusses the inference based on Bayesian methods. In [10] , a quantitative measure of inference risk is formally defined. In [11, 12] , the security against statistical inference is defined based on information theory. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the definition of method schemas. In Section 3, we discuss inference attacks and formulate the security problem. In Section 4, we show that the problem is undecidable, and propose a sufficient condition for a query to be secure. In Section 5, we show that the problem is decidable in the linear case. In Section 6, we discuss the relationship between type inferability and security decidability. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude this paper.
The OODB model
We adopt method schemas [4, 13] as a formal model of OODBs. Method schemas have such basic features of OODBs as method overloading, dynamic binding, and complex objects, although the returned value of a method execution is limited to a single object. The semantics can simply be defined based on term rewriting [14] . In this section, we first introduce some notations and concepts for term rewriting. Then, by using those notations and concepts, we restate the original definition of method schemas.
Notations
Let F be a family of disjoint sets F 0 , F 1 , F 2 , . . . , where, for a nonnegative integer n, F n is a set of function symbols of arity n. For a countable set X of variables, let T F (X) denote the set of all the terms freely generated by F and X. A term t ∈ T M (X) is linear if every variable in X appears in t at most once.
For a set U , let U n denote the Cartesian product U × · · · × U n . Hereafter, we often use a bold letter u to mean (u 1 , . . . , u n ) without explicitly mentioning it when n is irrelevant or obvious from the context. Also, we write u ∈ u if u = u i for some i. Define the set Pos(t) of positions of a term t as the smallest set of sequences of positive integers with the following two properties:
• The empty sequence ε is in Pos(t).
• For each 1 i n, if r ∈ Pos(t i ), then i · r ∈ Pos(f (t 1 , . . . , t n )), where the center dot "·" represents the concatenation of sequences.
Each position in Pos(t) specifies a subterm of t. For example, 1
The subterm of t at position r is denoted t/r. The replacement in t with t at position r, denoted t[r ← t ], is defined as follows:
Let V (t) denote the set of positions r of t such that t/r ∈ X. That is, V (t) is the positions of variables of t, and hence, 
Database schemas
Let C be a finite set of class names (or simply classes). Let M be a family of mutually disjoint finite sets
. . , where, for a nonnegative integer n, M n is a set of function symbols (or often called method names)
is called a base method name (respectively composite method name). We say that M is a method signature. (1) C is a finite set of class names, (2) is a partial order on C representing a class hierarchy, (3) M is a method signature, (4) Σ b is a set of base method definitions, and (5) Σ c is a set of composite method definitions.
For every combination c ∈ C n and m ∈ M n , there must exist at most one method definition of m at c. Example 5. An example of a method schema S 1 is shown in Fig. 3 . Manager is a subclass of Employee, and Server is a subclass of Host. Method boss(e) returns the direct boss of employee e, and method supervisor(e) returns the "second least manager" among the indirect bosses of e.
Inheritance
Let c ∈ C n and m ∈ M n . By Definition 4, the method definition of m at c may not exist. In this case, the definition of m at the smallest superclass of c is "inherited" by c. The inherited method definition is called resolution and defined as follows: 
Database instance
A database instance of a method schema assigns a set of objects to each class name. Also, it gives the semantics of base methods.
Definition 8 (Database instance).
A database instance of a method schema S is a pair I = (ν, μ) with the following properties:
(1) To each c ∈ C, ν assigns a finite disjoint set ν(c) of object identifiers (or simply, objects). Each o ∈ ν(c) is called an object of class c. 
In the above definition, ν(c)'s are defined to be disjoint. This definition can be easily modified so that ν(c) ⊆ ν(c ) for any c and c such that c c . However, as discussed later, we are often interested in the most specific (smallest) class of a given object. Hence, it is preferable that ν(c)'s are defined to be disjoint.
Method execution

A term in T M (O I ) is called an instantiated term.
That is, an instantiated term consists of method names in M and objects in O I . The one-step execution relation → I on the instantiated terms, based on the innermost reduction strategy, is defined as follows: Note that taking the innermost reduction strategy (i.e., rewriting only the term in the form of m (o)) is essential since the definition of m cannot be bound before knowing the classes of the arguments of m.
Let → * I be the reflexive and transitive closure of → I . The execution result of t, denoted t↓ I , is a term t such that t → * I t and there exists no t such that t → I t . Since → I has Church-Rosser property [14] , the execution result is uniquely determined. If t↓ I ∈ O I , then the execution of t is successful, and if t↓ I / ∈ O I , then the execution of t is aborted. In both cases (i.e., if t↓ I exists), the execution of t is terminating. On the other hand, if t↓ I does not exist, then the execution of t is nonterminating. We omit the subscript I of → I , → * I , and ↓ I if I is irrelevant or obvious from the context. Fig. 4 . ν 1 is represented by gray rectangles, e.g., ν 1 (Employee) = {Alice, John}. μ 1 is represented by arrows, e.g., μ 1 (boss)(John) = Alice, μ 1 (computer)(John) = mars. By Definition 9, supervisor(Alice) is executed as follows:
Example 10. An example of a database instance
Thus supervisor(Alice)↓ I 1 = Bob.
The security problem
Authorization
Various sophisticated method-based authorization models for OODBs have been proposed [1, 2] . In this paper, however, discussing authorization models is not our main purpose, and therefore we adopt the following simple but general method-based authorization model.
Definition 11 (Authorization). Let S = (C, , M, Σ b , Σ c ).
A right is a term in the form of m(c), where m ∈ M n and c ∈ C n . An authorization A is a finite set of rights and is interpreted as follows. Suppose that a user requests to directly invoke a method m on a tuple o of objects. Let c be the tuple of the classes such that o ∈ ν(c). If m(c) ∈ A, then the invocation is permitted. Otherwise, it is prohibited.
An authorization is often modeled as a pair of a base authorization and a set of inference rules. An example of an inference rule is "if u is authorized to invoke m on objects of c, then u is also authorized to invoke m on objects of the subclasses of c." When c 1 c and c 2 c, the base authorization {m(c)} is expanded into {m(c), m(c 1 ), m(c 2 )} by this rule. In this paper, we assume that a given authorization has already been expanded.
Example 12.
Define an authorization A 1 for a user u under S 1 in Fig. 3 as follows:
supervisor(Employee), supervisor(Manager), office(Employee), office(Manager) .
Consider the instance I 1 in Fig. 4 . Executing office(John) by u is permitted since John ∈ ν 1 (Employee) and office(Employee) ∈ A 1 . On the other hand, executing computer(Sara) is prohibited since Sara ∈ ν 1 (Manager) but computer(Manager) / ∈ A 1 .
Inference attacks and the security problem
In this section, we formalize inference attacks (Definition 15). We generally assume that user's knowledge is modeled as a set of (in)equalities (Section 3.2.1). For example, suppose that a user u executes office(John) and obtains the result A626. The information that u obtains is office(John)↓ = A626. Then, we restrict the power of the user's inference in a reasonable way and demonstrate that user's inference is modeled as equational reasoning (Section 3.2.2). Section 3.2.3 states formal definitions. In Definition 15, how to perform equational reasoning is defined as term rewriting rules. Then, in Definition 17, we define the security problem. Let τ be a term representing the query to be attacked. This term can be computed as it is if the user has authorization to all its methods. Even if the user does not have authorization to some methods in τ , there may exist an indirect way to compute τ by equivalently rewriting τ to another term involving only authorized methods. The term rewriting rules defined in Definition 15 are the rules that represent how to compute terms in a direct and/or indirect way. Thus, if τ cannot be rewritten into an object by the rewriting rules, τ is said to be secure.
General attacker model
First of all, we define the equalities which u can obtain directly from the execution results of authorized methods and their resolutions (Definition 6) as follows: In Example 1, ( * 1) and ( * 2) are stated informally. Also suppose that user u knows that o = o for distinct objects o and o (e.g., u knows John = Alice, Sara = A626, and so on). Then, to infer new knowledge, u can use at least four inference rules on equalities: reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and substitutivity (i.e., if
Assumptions on the attacker model
To make the attacker model theoretically simple, we would like to assume the following two conditions:
(Q1) User u can use no inference rules other than reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and substitutivity. In other words, the user's knowledge is the congruence closure of the direct knowledge ( * 1) and ( * 2). (Q2) The knowledge of u is represented by a set of ground equalities (i.e., equalities without variables).
In what follows, we demonstrate that assuming these conditions is reasonable.
(Q1) mentions the inference power of the user. We must exclude at least trivial cases where the user can use other inference rules. Let us examine one trivial case illustrated in the following example: Example 13. Recall the second case of Example 1, where u cannot infer computer(John)↓ = mars since there may be another host h such that computer(John)↓ = h and location(h)↓ = A626. However, if u knows that location(o)↓ = A626 for any other object o in the database instance, then u can conclude that computer(John) = mars.
In this example, u uses an inference rule such that an equality is inferred from the contents of O I and a set of inequalities. However, such inference becomes impossible if u does not know what O I is. Practically, just hiding O I from the user is sufficient for making the inference using inequalities impossible.
(Q2) requires that non-ground equalities obtained by ( * 2) can be translated into equivalent ground equalities. The following example suggests when such translation is possible.
Example 14.
Consider a schema with a composite method m c which has the same resolution t at every class c ∈ C. Let A = {m c (c) | c ∈ C} be an authorization for a user u.
Assume that u knows what C is. Then, u can infer that m c (t )↓ = t[t /x]↓ for any term t (no matter whether t ↓ ∈ O I or not), since m c has the same resolution t at any class. Note that, in this inference, u does not need to know which class t ↓ belongs to. In other words, u can substitute any term to the variable x in m c (x)↓ = t↓.
On the other hand, if u does not know what C is, then u cannot conclude that m c (t )↓ = t[t /x]↓ without exactly inferring the class to which t ↓ belongs (or inferring that the execution of t is aborted) since there may be another class c in C such that t ↓ ∈ ν(c) and Res(m c (c)) = t. However, since type inference [4, 5] is useless when u does not know what C is, to know the class to which t ↓ belongs is to infer the exact value of t ↓. Consequently, u can substitute only an object of class c to the variable x in m c (x)↓ = t↓.
Thus, when C is hidden from u, each equality Res(m c (c)) = t obtained by ( * 2) can be translated into
which is a finite set of ground equalities.
In summary, assuming (Q1) and (Q2) is practically reasonable. This means that user's inference can be defined as the congruence closure (by (Q1)) of a finite set of ground equalities (by (Q2)) induced by ( * 1) and ( * 2). For technical reasons, we define the congruence closure through rewriting rules £ I,A introduced below. From the correctness of Knuth-Bendix completion [14] , t↓ = o iff t is reducible to o by £ I,A .
Formal definitions
Now, we provide formal definitions of inference attacks and the security problem.
Definition 15 (Inference attacks).
Define P I,A as the minimum set of rewriting rules £ I,A on T M (O I ) satisfying the following three conditions. Intuitively, t £ I,A o means that the user knows or can infer that t↓ = o.
This corresponds to ( * 1).
This essentially corresponds to ( * 2). (C) If P I,A contains t £ I,A o and t £ I,A o such that t is a proper subterm of t at r , then P I,A contains
This simulates Knuth-Bendix completion procedure and, roughly speaking, corresponds to symmetry.
By definition, the right-hand side of each rule is an object. Note that the existence of t £ I,A o in P I,A implies t → * I o. Define ⇒ I,A as the one-step reduction relation by £ I,A . That is, t ⇒ I,A t iff there exists a subterm t of t at r such that t £ I,A o ∈ P I,A and t = t[r ← o ] (this corresponds to substitutivity). Let ⇒ * I,A denote the reflexive and transitive closure of ⇒ I,A (this corresponds to reflexivity and transitivity). For readability, we often write £ I and P I instead of £ I,A and P I,A , respectively. Rule (C1) indicates that the user can infer that location(mars)↓ = A626, as stated in the first case of Example 1. Moreover, rule (C2) indicates that location even for a server jupiter can be inferred. Let τ = office(boss(Sara)) and τ = office(boss(John)). Then,
Thus user u can infer that τ ↓ = B533. On the other hand, u cannot infer the value of τ ↓ (although τ ↓ = B533) since no subterm of τ can be rewritten by the rules in P I 1 ,A 1 .
Definition 17 (The security problem). A term τ ∈ T M (X) is said to be secure at a tuple c of classes under a schema S and an authorization A if there exists no instance
and o ∈ O I . Otherwise, τ is insecure at c under S and A. The security problem is to determine whether a given τ is secure at a given c under given S and A.
General case
Undecidability of the security problem for general schemas
We show that the security problem is undecidable by reducing the Modified Post's Correspondence Problem (MPCP) [15] to the security problem. The reduction strategy was obtained by modifying that of the proof of the undecidability of the type-consistency problem [16] .
Let (w, u) be an instance of the MPCP over alphabet Σ = {0, 1}, where w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ), u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ), and w i , u i ∈ Σ * . A solution of (w, u) is a finite sequence (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k ) of indices such that w i 1 
In what follows, we construct a schema S w,u , a term τ , and an authorization A such that (w, u) has a solution iff there exists a database instance I of S w,u under which the execution result of τ can be inferred. c 1 ), c ok ) .
A pair of a database instance (more precisely, the semantics of next) and an object of class c 1 is regarded to represent two things, a candidate (i 1 , . . . , i k ) for a solution of (w, u) and a string s over Σ , as illustrated in the following example.
Example 18. Consider the following instance (w, u) of the MPCP:
A typical database instance I 2 of S w,u is shown in Fig. 6 . In the figure, method next is represented by arrows. Pair (I 2 , o 1 ) represents the following candidate and string. First, the candidate is represented by the sequence of objects from o 1 to the "separator" object o of class c (the upper half of the figure). In the figure, the objects are of classes c 1 , c 3 , and c 2 , so the candidate is (1, 3, 2) . On the other hand, the string is represented by the sequence of objects between the "end marker" object o ok of class c ok and o (the lower half of the figure). In the figure, the objects are of classes c 1 , c 0 , c 1 , c 1 , c 1 , c 0 , and c 0 (in the reverse order with respect to next), so the represented string is 1011100. On the other hand, pair (I 2 , o 1 ) shown in Fig. 7 represents no candidates since no object of class c is "reachable" from o 1 under I 2 . Suppose that (I, o 1 ) represents a candidate (i 1 , . . . , i k ) and a string s as is the case of Fig. 6 (s is regarded as an infinite string if no "end marker" object of class c ok is reachable from the "separator" object o). To check whether the candidate is actually a solution, we examine whether both w i 1 · · · w i k = s and u i 1 · · · u i k = s. Unary composite methods isw and isu are used for that purpose. Let w i = w i,1 w i,2 · · · w i,d i for each i (1 i n) , where w i,j ∈ Σ. The definitions of method isw and its auxiliary composite methods isw i,j are constructed as follows:
where unary base method dummy is defined so that it always returns an object of class c dummy .
The execution of isw(o 1 ) under I 2 in Fig. 6 is as follows:
Lastly, binary base method post is defined so that it always returns an object of class c dummy regardless of its arguments.
Define authorization A as
Lemma 20. τ is insecure at c 1 iff (w, u) has a solution. Note that the undecidability holds even if the "height" of the class hierarchy is one. On the other hand, in our conjecture, the security problem is decidable if the "height" of the class hierarchy is zero. The proof will be similar to the one of Theorem 1 in [16] , which shows the decidability of the type-consistency problem for schemas with the height of the class hierarchy zero.
A decidable sufficient condition for the security
In this section we propose a decidable sufficient condition for a given term τ ∈ T M (X) to be secure at c. The main idea is to use classes instead of objects for analyzing the security. To do so, we introduce new rewriting rules on T M (C) which "conservatively" approximate £ I,A , i.e., if τ is insecure at c, then τ [c/x] is reducible to a class c by the new rewriting rules.
Intuitively, each t[c/x] ∈ T M (C) is considered as the set of instantiated terms t[o/x] such that o ∈ ν(c). In order to compute the "execution result" of t[c/x], the result E S of type inference would be useful, where E S is defined as follows: c ∈ E S (t, c) iff there is a database instance I = (ν, μ) of S such that t[o/x]↓ I ∈ ν(c) for some o ∈ ν(c).
In what follows, we first summarize the known results on type inference for method schemas. Next, new rewriting rules for conservatively approximating inference attacks are introduced. Then, a sufficient condition for the security is proposed (Theorem 25) and its correctness and complexity are discussed.
Known results on type inference
Unfortunately, E S is uncomputable in general [4] . However, it is possible to compute an over-estimation
that is, Z(t[c/x]) ⊇ E S (t, c)
for every pair of t and c. The algorithm in [5] gives an overestimation of E S by computing the least fixpoint ofẐ satisfying the following four kinds of equations: 
m(c ) .
Let Z be the least fixpoint ofẐ. Also let t be an arbitrary term in T M (X). It is guaranteed in [5] that Z(t[c/x]) ⊇ E S (t, c). Moreover, if S contains only unary methods, then Z is identical with E S .
Example 22. Using the algorithm in [5] , we can compute Z for schema S 1 in Fig. 3 . The result is presented in Fig. 8 . For example, Z(boss(Employee)) = {Employee, Manager} means that for any object e of Employee, the result of boss(e) is an object of either Employee or Manager. Actually, the obtained Z is equal to E S 1 since S 1 contains only unary methods.
Conservative approximation of inference attacks
In order to approximate inference attacks, we use an over-estimation Z of E S since E S is uncomputable of £ I,A (Definition 15) except that the objects are replaced with the possible classes indicated by Z. Since Z is an over-estimation of E S , all the object-level inference is captured by the corresponding class-level inference (see Theorem 25 below for formal discussion), but the converse is not necessarily true.
Definition 23 (Approximation of inference attacks). Define P S,A,Z as the minimum set of rewriting rules £ S,A,Z on T M (C) satisfying the following three conditions: (A) If m(c) ∈ A, then P S,A,Z contains m(c) £ S,A,Z c for each c ∈ Z(m(c)). (B) If m c (c) ∈ A, m c ∈ M c , and Res(m c (c)) = t = ⊥, then P S,A,Z contains t[c/x] £ S,A,Z c for each c ∈ Z(t[c/x]). (C) If P S contains t £ S,A,Z c and t £ S,A,Z c such that t is a proper subterm of t at r , then P S,A,Z contains t[r ← c ] £ S,A,Z c for each c ∈ Z(t[r ← c ]).
Define ⇒ S,A,Z as the one-step reduction relation by £ S,A,Z . Let ⇒ * S,A,Z denote the reflexive and transitive closure of ⇒ S,A,Z . For readability, we often write £ S and P S instead of £ S,A,Z and P S,A,Z , respectively. Example 24. Figure 9 presents the contents of P S 1 ,A 1 ,Z for schema S 1 in Fig. 3 , A 1 in Example 12, and Z in Fig. 8 . Rule (Cii) indicates that the user may be able to infer the location of a server. Moreover, rules (Avi) and (Bii) together indicate that the user may be able to infer the office of the boss of a manager. Compare this with the explanation in Example 16.
Next, consider a looser estimation Z , which is identical to Z except that
Then, P S 1 ,A 1 ,Z contains the following two rules as well as all the rules in P S 1 ,A 1 ,Z :
Rules (Aiii ) and (Ai) together indicate that the user may be able to infer the computer of the supervisor of an employee. However, it is impossible to do so because the supervisor of an employee is always a manager and computer(Manager) is unauthorized by A 1 . In this sense, P S 1 ,A 1 ,Z is a worse approximation than P S 1 ,A 1 ,Z .
The proposed sufficient condition
The proposed sufficient condition for the security is stated as the following theorem:
Theorem 25. Let τ ∈ T M (X). If there exists no class c such that τ [c/x] ⇒ * S,A,Z c, then τ is secure at c, i.e., there exists no instance
An overview of the correctness of the proposed sufficient condition is illustrated in Fig. 10 . We first prove that each rule in P I is conservatively approximated by a rule in P S .
Lemma 26. If there is an instance
Proof. We use induction on the structure of the definition of £ I (see Definition 15) . Induction.
)), and suppose that t [o /x ]£ I o is obtained from Definition 15(C). By the inductive hypothesis, P S contains both t[c/x]£ S c and t
From the above inductive hypothesis and Definition 23(C), we can conclude that t [c /x ] £ S c ∈ P S . P Example 27. Consider schema S 1 in Fig. 3 , and let τ = office(boss(x)). We can conclude that τ is secure at Employee since no subterm of τ [Employee/x] can be rewritten by any rule P S 1 ,A 1 ,Z in Fig. 9 .
Example 28. We said that computer(x) is secure at Employee in the second case of Example 1. Actually, it is not difficult to see that P S has only location(Host) £ S Room and office(Employee) £ S Room. This implies that computer(x) is secure at Employee.
The proposed sufficient condition is obviously decidable, since the right-hand side of each rule £ S,A,Z is a class and therefore the "size" of the term decreases every time a rule is applied. In what follows, we summarize the time complexity of deciding the sufficient condition. Define the size of a term t as |Pos(t)|, i.e., the number of positions of t. Define the description length of Σ c , denoted Σ c , as the sum of the size of all t such that (m(c), t) ∈ Σ c . Also, define the size of S, denoted S , as follows:
Let k be the maximum arity of all the methods. The height of t is defined as the maximum length of the positions in Pos(t). Let L and H be the maximum size and height of all t in {t | (m(c), t) ∈ Σ c } ∪ {τ }, respectively. The total time complexity (including computation of
See Appendix A for details.
Linear case
Type inferability of linear schemas
A schema S is linear if for every composite method definition (m c (c), t) in S, t is linear. We show that linear terms are type inferable under linear schemas, which is an improvement of the known result in [5] .
Theorem 29. E S (t, c) is computable if both S and t are linear.
Proof. Let S be a linear schema. We introduce a syntactic instance I S = (ν S , μ S ) of S as follows. Let N be a sufficiently large positive integer.
(1) For each c ∈ C, define ν S (c) = {c · α | α ∈ C * and the length of c · α is at most N }.
Here, C * denotes the Kleene closure of C.
The first (leftmost) symbol c of an object c · α in a syntactic instance I S represents the class of the object. In what follows, we show that E S can be computed by the algorithm in [5] . See the four kinds of equations in Section 4.2.1. Let Z be the least fixpoint ofẐ. We already have Z(t[c/x]) ⊇ E S (t, c) by [5] for any linear term t ∈ T M (X), and therefore, it suffices to show the opposite containment. The set of objects of a syntactic instance contains all the sequences of classes of length less than or equal to N . Therefore, for any linear term t ∈ T M (X), there always exist objects of a syntactic instance (with a sufficiently large N ) which exactly encode the fixpoint computation of Z(t). In other words, for any linear term t with variables x, there always exist objects o of classes c such • ConsiderẐ(c). We haveẐ(c) = {c} and c · α → * of m(t 1 , . . . , t n ) and the inductive hypothesis again, for every 1 i n and for such α i , there exists o i ∈ ν S (c i )
The theorem has been proved since Z(t[c/x]) is computable and E S (t, c) = Z(t[c/x])
if both S and t are linear. P
Decidability of the security of linear terms under linear schemas
The decidability of the security of linear terms under linear schemas immediately follows the next theorem since E S is computable under linear schemas. More concretely, the sufficient condition of the security proposed in the previous section becomes a necessary one if S and τ are linear and E S is used as Z. We show that a syntactic instance I S = (ν S , μ S ) with sufficiently large N satisfies the theorem. The outline of the proof is as follows (see also Fig. 11 ). It suffices to show the soundness of the approximated inference attacks (i.e., that ⇒ *
Theorem 30. Let S be a linear schema and let τ be a linear term in T M (X). There is a class c such that
S,A,E S
implies ⇒ * I S ,A ) in linear case. This property can be proved by showing that £ S,A,E S implies £ I S ,A (Lemma 34) and then by lifting it to rewrite sequences (Lemma 35). For Lemma 35, we need to show that the existence of an approximation rule in Definition 23(C) guarantees the existence of an inference rule in Definition 15(C) in a syntactic instance. This can be done with the help of Lemma 33, which states that type information E S is closed under term composition.
The crucial point lies in constructing a substitution mapping into I S which shows the soundness of the approximation in the proof of Lemma 34. Remember that only the first argument of a base method is used for constructing the returned value of the method in I S . If a linear term t does not contain a composite method, it is easy to find the variable Fig. 11 . An overview of the soundness of the approximated inference attacks. position which contributes the execution result of t (called the principal position as defined below). For example, for term m 1 (m 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), x 3 ) for base methods m 1 and m 2 , the principal position is the position of x 1 . For an arbitrary linear term t, the principal position can also be found although it needs a recursive search since composite methods may appear in t. Furthermore, we can choose objects that encode the fixpoint computation of E S (= Z in linear case) and substitute the objects to the variables in t to construct a term that simulates E S in a syntactic instance. A mapping that specifies these objects is called a consumed string mapping (CSM for short), and is defined in parallel with the principal position. In the proof of Lemma 34, the substitution mapping into I S will be constructed using CSMs and principal positions.
In what follows, CSMs and principal positions are defined. Their existence is shown in a constructive manner. Then, the soundness of the approximated inference attacks is shown using CSMs and principal positions.
Definitions of CSMs and principal positions Definition 31. Let t be a linear term in T M (X). Let σ : V (t) → C and c ∈ E S (t, σ ).
A consumed string mapping (CSM for short) of (t, σ, c ) is a mapping β : V (t) → C + satisfying the following conditions:
(1) The first (leftmost) symbol of β(r) is σ (r) for each r ∈ V (t); and (2) There is a position ξ ∈ V (t), called the principal position of (t, β), such that 4 and β(1 · 2) = c 2 is a CSM of (t, σ, c 4 ) and 1 · 1 is the principal position of (t, β) because for any
Fig . 12 . A CSM β of (t, σ, c ) and the principal position ξ of (t, β).
Thus, β represents the prefixes of the object names that are "consumed" during the execution of t under I S . For another example, let t = m c (x 1 , x 2 ). Let σ : V (t ) → C be a substitution such that σ (1) = c 2 and σ (2) = c 1 . Then, β : V (t ) → C + with β (1) = c 2 and β (2) = c 1 · c 3 is a CSM of (t , σ , c 3 ) and 2 is the principal position of (t , β ) because for any
Note that c ∈ E S (t, σ ) = E S (t, c), one of the preconditions in Definition 31, is equivalent to c ∈ Z(t[c/x]) by Theorem 29. Thus, c ∈ E S (t, σ ) means that fixpoint computation of t[c/x] derives c . By Theorem 29, this computation can be simulated by a syntactic instance I S . For a CSM mapping β and a variable position r in t, β(r) denotes the prefix of an object (i.e., a sequence of class names) substituted at r which is consumed during the execution of t to simulate the fixpoint computation.
Existence of CSMs and principal positions
In this section, we will effectively show the existence of a CSM β of (t, σ, c ) and the principal position of (t, β). If t consists of only base methods, the story is easy to follow. By the definition of syntactic instances, each base method consumes the first symbol of its first argument. A CSM can be constructed by concatenating such consumed symbols. However, t may contain recursively-defined composite methods, and therefore, we cannot use the induction on the structure of t. Instead, we use the induction on the execution length. Since c ∈ E S (t, σ ), there must be a Basis. Consider the zero-length reduction xθ = o ∈ ν S (c ). Then, a mapping β such that β(ε) = c is a CSM of (x, σ, c ). Also, ε is the principal position of (x, β).
Induction. Consider a reduction tθ → I S t θ → * I S o ∈ ν S (c ), where θ : V (t ) → O I S . Let σ : V (t ) → C be the mapping such that θ (r ) ∈ ν S (σ (r )) for each r ∈ V (t ).
Also, let q ∈ Pos(t) be the position contracted in the first step of this reduction, and let m(x ) = t/q. Assume inductively that β : V (t ) → C + is a CSM of (t , σ , c ) and ξ ∈ V (t ) is the principal position of (t , β ).
(i) Suppose that m is a base method. Then, the following β is a CSM of (t, σ, c ) (see also Fig. 13 ):
otherwise.
The principal position ξ of (t, β) is as follows:
(ii) Suppose that m is a composite method. Let r i denote the position of x i ∈ x in Res(tσ/q) (note that tσ/q is in the form of m(c)). Then, the following β is a CSM of (t, σ, c ) (see also Fig. 14) :
We must show that β and ξ constructed above are indeed a CSM and the principal position. The basis can be verified easily. For the induction case, consider a reduction tθ → I S t θ → *
I S o ∈ ν S (c ).
(i) Suppose that m is a base method. By the construction, the first symbol of β(q · i) is σ (q · i). Moreover, for any r ∈ V (t) − {q · i | 1 i n}, the first symbol of β(r) is equal to that of β (r), and it is σ (r) by the inductive hypothesis. tθ/r must be equal to t θ /r, and therefore, σ (r) = σ (r). Hence, the condition (1) in Definition 31 holds. For the condition (2a), there are two cases to be considered. Suppose that q = ξ . Since ξ = ξ · 1 = q · 1, the last symbol of β(ξ ) is that of σ (ξ) · β (ξ ), and therefore, it is c by the inductive hypothesis. On the other hand, suppose that q = ξ . Since ξ = ξ , the last symbol of β(ξ ) is that of β (ξ ), and therefore, it is c again by the inductive hypothesis. Thus the condition (2a) holds. Let (ii) Suppose that m is a composite method. The first symbol of β(q · i) is equal to that of β (q · r i ), and it is σ (q · r i ) by the inductive hypothesis. By the definition of r i , tθ/q · i is equal to t θ /q · r i , and therefore, σ (q · r i ) = σ (q · i). Moreover, for any r ∈ V (t) − {q · i | 1 i n}, the first symbol of β(r) is equal to that of β (r), and it is σ (r) by the inductive hypothesis. tθ/r is equal to t θ /r, and therefore, σ (r) = σ (r). Hence, the condition (1) in Definition 31 holds. For the condition (2a), there are two cases to be considered. Suppose that q is a prefix of ξ . Then, there must be j such that q · r j = ξ , and therefore, ξ = q · j . Hence the last symbol of β(ξ ) is that of β (ξ ), and it is c by the inductive hypothesis. On the other hand, suppose that q is not a prefix of ξ . Then, ξ = ξ by the construction. The last symbol of β(ξ ) is that of β (ξ ), and it is c by the inductive hypothesis. Thus the condition (2a) holds. 
Then, tθ β → I S t θ β by the definitions of method execution, and t θ β → * I S c · α ξ by the inductive hypothesis. Thus the condition (2b) holds.
Soundness of the approximated inference attacks
The following lemma states that E S is closed under term composition. This property is needed for showing that existence of an approximation rule in Definition 23(C) implies the existence of an attacker's inference rule in Definition 15(C), in the proof of Lemma 34. Fig. 15 ).
Lemma 33. Let t, t , and t be linear terms in
T M (X) such that t = t [q ← t ] for some q ∈ V (t ). Let σ : V (t) → C, σ : V (t ) → C and σ : V (t ) → C be mappings such that for some c ∈ C,
σ (r)
= c if r = q, σ (r) otherwise, σ (r ) = σ (q · r ).
Now, suppose that c ∈ E S (t , σ ) and c ∈ E S (t , σ ). Then, c ∈ E S (t, σ ) (see also
Proof. Let β : V (t ) → C + and β : V (t ) → C + be arbitrary CSMs of (t , σ , c ) and (t , σ , c ), respectively.
where γ q is the string obtained from β (q) by removing its first symbol. Also, let θ : V (t ) → O I S be a mapping such that θ (r ) = β (r ) · γ q for all r ∈ V (t ). Then, t θ → * 
where γ q is the string obtained from θ (q) by removing its first symbol. Also, let θ : V (t ) → O I S be a mapping such that θ (r ) = β (r ) · γ q for all r ∈ V (t ). Then, tθ ⇒ I S t θ using t θ £ I S c · γ q in P I S . Thus, we have tθ ⇒ * I S c . P
Incomparability of type inferability and security decidability
For general terms and schemas, type inference is impossible and the security is undecidable. On the other hand, for linear terms and schemas, type inference is possible and the security is decidable. A natural question is whether the undecidability of the security stems only from the impossibility of type inference. In this section, we provide a negative answer to this question.
Theorem 36. The security of a non-linear term τ at c under a schema S is undecidable even if S is linear and E S (τ, c) is computable.
Proof. Consider the reduction from the MPCP to the security problem stated in Section 4.1. Let τ = post(isw(x), isu(x)). Since S w,u is linear, it suffices to show that E S w,u (τ, c 1 ) = {c dummy } for any (w, u).
Consider Note that Theorems 30 and 36 show a tight bound of the decidability of the security problem. That is, the nonlinearity of only τ makes the problem undecidable.
In order for the security to be decidable, type inference of tuples of terms seems necessary. The essence of the reduction stated in Section 4.1 is whether for some pair (I, o 1 ), both isw(o 1 ) and isu(o 1 ) return objects of the same class c ok under I . Thus, the results of "separated" type inference, i.e., E S w,u (isw(x), c 1 ) and E S w,u (isu(x), c 1 ), are insufficient. However, it is open whether type inference of tuples of terms is sufficient for the security to be decidable.
A natural next question may be whether the security problem is more difficult than type inference. We provide a negative answer again.
Theorem 37. E S (τ, c) is uncomputable even if S is linear and the security of τ at c is decidable.
Proof. Consider again S w,u and A defined in Section 4.1. Modify the definition of post so that post(o, o ) returns an object of class c ok if both o and o are objects of c ok , and it returns an object of class c dummy otherwise. Also, add to A the rights of post on any class. Then, the security of τ = post(isw(x), isu(x)) at c 1 is trivially decidable (i.e., τ is always insecure at c 1 ) since the user can invoke post on any objects. However, E S (τ, c 1 ) is uncomputable since c ok ∈ E S (τ, c 1 ) if and only if (w, u) has a solution. P The above theorem states that the security of τ may be easily decided using only A. In that case, whether τ is secure or not is no help for type inference of τ . Thus, security decidability does not imply type inferability.
Conclusions
We have formalized the security problem against inference attacks on OODBs, and shown that the problem is undecidable. Then we have proposed a decidable sufficient condition for a given query to be secure, by introducing class-level inference (£ S ) which conservatively approximates object-level inference (£ I ). We believe that the approximation is fairly tight in spite of its simple definition, since the sufficient condition becomes a necessary one when the given schema is linear.
It is impossible to formalize the whole "inference engine" of the attacker. We have focused on inference based on equational logic because it is one of the most fundamental and powerful kind of inference. It is practically significant that we can verify the security against such fundamental and powerful inference, although the linearity condition is necessary.
Although type inferability and decidability of the security problem are incomparable, they still seem to be closely related. Especially, as stated in Section 6, type inference of tuples of terms may be helpful for deciding the security problem. One of the future works is to examine the relationship between the type inference of tuples of terms and the decidability of the security problem.
We have assumed that a user knows the definitions of composite methods only if the methods are authorized to the user. However, in some situations, the definitions of unauthorized methods may be open to the public or can be guessed from the method names, etc. Weakening this assumption makes the definition of inference technically complicated, and therefore left as a future work. Next, consider (S2). Define Q = {t | t £ S c ∈ P S }. In order to compute P S , it suffices to compute Q, since the right-hand side of £ S can be computed from the left-hand side and Z. Figure 16 shows a procedure for computing Q. Suppose that variables Q ans , Q , Q , and Z are implemented by binomial heaps. Let ρ Q ans denote the complexity of retrieving an element from or inserting an element into Q ans . Define ρ Q , ρ Q , and ρ Z in the same way. Then,
where L is for a key comparison.
Before analyzing the procedure in Fig. 16 in detail, we estimate |Q|. Since it is difficult to estimate |Q| directly, we introduce a finite set Q 0 of terms which possibly appear in the left-hand side of £ S . Formally,
where X t (t ∈ T M (C)) is defined as follows:
X m(t) = C ∪ m(t ) t i ∈ X t i .
Intuitively, X t is the set of all the terms obtained by replacing arbitrary subterms of t with arbitrary classes. Clearly Q ⊆ Q 0 .
The size of X t can be obtained by solving the following (in)equalities: 
using k L. See (T8) through (T16). By Q and Q , we avoid selecting a duplicated pair of t and t in (T10). In other words, (T11) through (T15) are executed at most |Q| 2 times, and therefore, (T16) is also executed at most |Q| 2 times. Moreover, (T13) is executed at most |Q| times, since the condition of (T12) holds at most |Q| times.
In (T11), Knuth-Morris-Pratt string matching algorithm [17] can check in O(L) time whether t is a subterm of t. Constructing t[r ← c] in (T15) takes O(L) time. Computing Q ans ∪ Q takes O(L log |Q|) time [17] . Therefore, the complexity of (T11) through (T16) except (T13) is
On the other hand, in (T13), Z(t) is computed from Z 0 as follows: output "τ may be insecure at c" U11 else U12
output "τ is secure at c" 
The time complexity of computing Z(t) is
The total complexity of (T13) is 
